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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Is a dog sniff at the front door of a private residence by a canine detection unit a Fourth
Amendment search?

II.

Is a dog sniff of the air outside a private residence a minimally invasive search requiring
less than probable cause to initiate?
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r
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^

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
V.

JOELIS JARDINES,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court is reported at Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34
(Fla. 2011). The opinion of the Florida Court of Appeals is reported at 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. App. 3
Dist. 2008).
^

JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first issue of whether a sniff search constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment requires a two-part analysis. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967). The first part examines whether an individual maintained a “subjective” expectation of
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privacy in the object challenged by the search. Id This inquiry is a question of fact and is
subject to review under the clear error standard. United States v. McKennon. 814 F.2d 1539,
1542-43 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Edmondson. 791 F.2d 1512, 1514 (11th Cir.
r

1986)). The second part of the Katz test inquires as to whether society is willing to recognize the
defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable. Katz. 389 U.S. at 360. That inquiry is a
question of law and is subject to a de novo review. McKennon. 814 F.2d at 1543 (citing

e

California v. Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207, 211-214 (1986)).
The second issue of whether a sniff search requires probable cause or reasonable
suspicion is a question of law subject to de novo review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
r

691 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
r

Procedural History
On January 12, 2007, Prosecutors for Miami-Dade County in Florida charged Joelis
Jardines with one count of cannabis trafficking and one count of grand theft in the third degree.
(J.A. 2.) On June 5, 2007, Jardines filed a motion to suppress all evidence found at his home and
all subsequent statements he made. (J.A. 19.) Jardines argued: (1) that detectives investigating
his case did not possess the requisite probable cause necessary to conduct a search of his home;

r

(2) that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement was not applicable in this case; and
(3) that the evidence found at Jardines’ home and his subsequent statements were fruit of the
poisonous tree. (J.A. 16-19.) Judge William Thomas granted Jardines’ motion on June 13,
2007, relying on State v. Rabb. 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), long standing Florida state
law holding the use of drug detection dogs at homes to be a Fourth Amendment search. (J.A.
134, 140-41.) Judge Thomas further held that the anonymous tip implicating Jardines was not
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corroborated and the surveillance conducted by detectives at his home was insufficient to
establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant for his home. (J.A. 134-37.)
While prosecutors had argued that investigators detected the smell of marijuana outside his
home, Judge Thomas held that the drug detection dog indicated the presence of marijuana in the
home first which tainted any detection by investigators on the scene. (J.A. 135.)
The State of Florida appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third
District. State v. Jardines. 9 So. 3d 1, 1 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2008). In a departure from
longstanding Florida case law, the appellate court held; (1) that the use of a highly-trained drug
detection dog at Jardines’ home was not a search; (2) that the presence of investigators at
Jardines’ door did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights; (3) that there was sufficient
evidence for probable cause for the search warrant; and (4) that absent probable cause, the
evidence found in Jardines’ home would be admissible through the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Id at 1-15.
Jardines appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d
34, 34 (Fla. 2011). The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its departure from
Florida V. Rabb. 549 U.S. 1052 (2006). The Court held that a sniff search is a Fourth
Amendment search and that probable cause is the evidentiary standard necessary for a sniff
search. Jardines. 73 So. 3d at 35-37. Furthermore, the court held that because investigators did
not have probable cause for the sniff search, the evidence was not lawfully obtained. Id at 54.
Absent the unlawfully obtained sniff search evidence, detectives did not have sufficient evidence
to establish the probable cause necessary for the search warrant of Jardines’ home. Id at 54-55.
The State of Florida filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on
January 6, 2012. (J.A. 144.) The questions certified by this Court are; (1) whether a dog sniff at
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the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained drug detection dog is a Fourth Amendment
search; and (2) whether a dog sniff of the air outside a private residence constitutes a minimally
invasive search requiring less than probable cause. (J.A. 144.)
Statement of the Facts
On Friday, November 3, 2006, an anonymous crime stoppers caller reported to police that
marijuana was being grown at Jardines’ residence. (J.A. 8.) Jardines’ home address is 13005
S.W. 257th Terrace. (J.A. 3.) On the morning of Tuesday, December 5, 2006, Detective Bartelt,
his drug detection dog, and Detective Pedraja set up a perimeter around the residence to survey
the area. (J.A. 32.) The Detectives conducted a fifteen minute surveillance of Jardines’ home.
(J.A. 32.) During the surveillance, Detective Pedraja observed that the home’s blinds were
closed, the air conditioner was running continuously and that there was no traffic to or from the
residence. (J.A. 38.) Following their survey. Detective Bartelt and his canine approached the
front door to conduct a sniff search. (J.A. 50.) Detective Pedraja waited behind Detective
Bartelt. (J.A. 35.) As Detective Bartelt and the canine approached Jardines’ residence, the
canine energetically pulled, fiilly extending the six foot leash and drawing Detective Bartelt
toward the door. (J.A. 49.)
Upon reaching the fi’ont door, the canine began bracketing, indicating that he had
detected the odor of one or more of the controlled substances he is trained to detect. (J.A. 52.)
Detective Bartelt reported that he did not smell marijuana, but did detect the smell of moth balls.
(J.A. 55.) Detective Bartelt indicated to Detective Pedraja that the canine gave a positive alert
for the odor of narcotics. (J.A. 53.) Detective Pedraja then approached and stated that he
smelled marijuana at the front door. (J.A. 36.)

Detective Pedraja prepared a search warrant using the information obtained from the
canine sniff, as well as the facts that the air conditioner was running, the blinds were closed, and
the anonymous crime stoppers tip. (J.A. 110.) Judge George Sarduy for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida then signed the search warrant. (J.A. 110.)
About an hour later, members of the Miami-Dade Police Department Narcotics Bureau
and DEA Agents set up a perimeter in preparation to execute the warrant. (J.A. 17.) The agents
executed the search warrant by gaining entry into the residence through the front door. (J.A. 17.)
According to the DEA report, Jardines exited the residence through the rear sliding glass door
and was then detained by Special Agent Wilson. (J.A. 17.) Agents found a marijuana lab in the
southwest comer of the residence during the course of the search. (J.A. 17.) Detective Pedraja
subsequently interviewed Jardines, who confessed both orally and in a written statement. (J.A.
17.) Based on the obtained evidence and confession, Jardines was charged with Trafficking in
Cannabis, a first degree felony, and Grand Theft in the third degree. (J.A. 17.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision should be upheld. The use of a drug detection dog
at the front door of a private residence to reveal details within the home which the officer could
not otherwise obtain without going into the constitutionally protected area constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. Under this Court’s test in Katz. Jardines manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in his home by closing his blinds, windows, and doors. This Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates that society recognizes a citizen’s right to retreat
into their home and be free from government intrusion. Government activity that seeks to reveal
the intimate details within the home which an individual seeks to keep private is an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.
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This Court’s decisions holding that dog sniff searches are permissible in public places are
not applicable to the home because citizens may reasonably expect to be free from government
intrusions in their home, but have less of an expectation when in public. Each of the cases this
Court upheld involved situations where the government had a traditional interest in regulating
public safety and do not warrant extension where citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy are
at their highest.
The Fourth Amendment search of Jardines’ home required probable cause. A Fourth
Amendment search presumptively carries the evidentiary burden of probable cause. Exceptions
to the general rule requiring probable cause for searches first requires that a court find that
“special needs” necessitate a lower evidentiary standard, such as a need to protect the public or
police officers. If such “special needs” exist, then the court must balance the public and
government interests in conducting the search against the individual’s expectation of privacy in
the contents of the search and the level of intrusion. The Court looks first to the government
interests in the search and then weighs those interests against the invasiveness of the search.
Here, the search of Jardines’ home does not fit within the exception to the general rule. The
search was not in conformity with a “special need” of law enforcement, nor did the minimal
government interests outweigh the significant presumption that Jardines has an expectation of
privacy in his home and the significant invasiveness of a search of that location. Because the
detectives did not possess the requisite probable cause to search his home, this Court should
uphold the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.
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ARGUMENT
1.

THE USE OF A DRUG DETECTION DOG AT A CITIZEN’S FRONT PORCH TO
REVEAL INTIMATE DETAILS WITHIN THE HOME IS A FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH REQUIRING PROBABLE CAUSE.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphasis added). The search of
Jardines’ home involved a drug detection dog coming onto his front porch and sniffing under his
front door to detect objects within the home. (J.A. 1.)
In determining whether a search has occurred, this Court has utilized the test set out in
Katz V. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), where the court determines (1) whether a
person has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Application of the Fourth Amendment
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” that has been invaded by government action. Id
A.

Jardines Exhibited His Subjective Expectation of Privacy in His Home by Closing
the Blinds. Windows, and Doors.

The first prong of Katz looks to the affirmative conduct persons undertake to protect their
privacy. United States v. Knotts. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Where the individual has shown
that “he seeks to preserve [something] as private” it is inferred that the person has a subjective
expectation of privacy. Id.
For example, in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986), Ciraolo constructed a
ten foot fence to shield his marijuana growing operation from neighbors and police. In holding
that the construction of a ten foot fence was sufficient to demonstrate that Ciraolo manifested an
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expectation of privacy in his backyard, this Court stated that “[c]learly-and understandablyrespondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain
privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits.” Id. at 211.
Similarly, in Katz, the defendant manifested his subjective expectation of privacy by
closing the door behind him while using a telephone booth. 389 U.S. at 347. This Court stated,
“one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.” Id.
at 361.
Here, Jardines manifested his expectation of privacy in the contents of his home by
shutting his windows, blinds, and doors. (J.A. 3.) Like Ciraolo. Jardines’ conduct shields an
area which he seeks to keep private, indicating his intent to maintain privacy within his home.
As in Katz, merely shutting the door behind oneself can manifest one’s intent to have privacy.
Jardines’ affirmative conduct of shutting his blinds, windows, and doors clearly manifested his
subjective expectation of privacy.
Moreover, even if Jardines’ actions are ambiguous, an expectation of privacy is presumed
to apply to the contents of the home. United States v. Taborda. 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
1980). Citizens need not actively hide their conduct if they are in their home, “the very fact that
a person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to have privacy.” Id
The sniff search was used to reveal objects within Jardines’ home which he subjectively intended
to conceal, in an area where an expectation of privacy is presumed to apply.
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B.

Jardines' Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the Intimate Details Within His
Home Is a Reasonable Expectation That Society Recognizes.

The second prong of the Katz test inquires into reasonableness of the expectation of
privacy, “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Oliver v. United States. 466 U.S. 170,182-83 (1984).
This Court has held that at the very core of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). Given the special place the home has in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). The attempt to
reveal objects within the home without a warrant is a clear violation of the standard set out by
this Court because “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’ That
line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear specification of those
methods of surveillance that require a warrant.” Id. at 590.
1.

The sniff test intrudes beyond the firm line drawn at the entrance to the
home because drug dogs detect information from within the home that
officers could not otherwise obtain without intruding into the
constitutionally protected area.

This Court has been clear that the contents of the home are protected and that any breach
of the right to privacy within the home is impermissible. Id at 584-585. In Kyllo v, United
States. 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001), this Court addressed the issue of whether police, without a
warrant, could use a thermal-imaging device to scan a private home to detect a heat signature
similar to that put out by high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana. After becoming
suspicious that marijuana was being grown at Kyllo’s residence, police scanned the outside of
the home with a thermal-imaging device, which showed a portion of the house was inordinately
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warm. Id. at 28. Police obtained a warrant using the information from the thermal-imaging
device and searched the residence, finding live marijuana plants inside. Id. at 27. After the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Kyllo’s motion to suppress and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, this Court reversed, reasoning:
[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most
commonly litigated are of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and this is acknowledged
to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We
think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area: constitutes a search—at least where (as
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.
14 at 29.
The thermal-imaging detector was used to detect objects from within the home, which
police could not otherwise obtain without intruding into the constitutionally protected area. This
Court held a search occurred despite the fact that this search was conducted to determine whether
drugs were present in the home. Id at 37. The use of the thermal-imaging detector was
unconstitutional because it could be used to reveal intimate details within the home. Id. at 39.
Although police did not actually detect intimate details in this case, the mere possibility
that police technology could be used for those ends was enough:

The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the
lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider
“intimate”; and a much more sophisticated system might detect nothing more intimate
than the fact that someone left a closet light on. We could not, in other words, develop a
rule approving only that through-the-wall surveillance which identifies objects no smaller
than 36 by 36 inches, but would have to develop a jurisprudence specifying which home
activities are “intimate” and which are not.

Furthermore, the fact that the heat signature the police sought to detect was permeating
from the home was immaterial. This Court was concerned advancing technology would
effectively allow police to enter the constitutionally protected area, “leav[ing] the homeowner at
the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human
activity in the home.” Id. at 35-36. This Court articulated the clear rule, that “obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public
use.” Id at 34.
While drug detection dogs do not involve complex circuitry like the thermal-imaging
detector in Kvllo. they do represent a tool that has been refined over centuries that police use to
obtain information regarding the contents of the home that they otherwise could not without
physical intrusion into the home. Although golden retrievers are in general public use, highly
trained drug detection dogs with years of experience are hardly commonplace. (J.A. 26.)
Furthermore, this Court stated in Kvllo that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in his
home despite the presence of contraband. Id at 39. Jardines has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the intimate details within his home notwithstanding the presence of marijuana.
Similarly, in United States v. Karo. 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984), police used technology to
track the location of a can of ether, which was being used to extract cocaine from clothing.
Police used a beeper monitor to track the marked can inside of the defendant’s house, and
obtained a warrant to search the house based in part on information derived through use of the
beeper. Id This Court held “[t]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not
opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a
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justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.” Id. at 714. The fact that police could not
have obtained that information without entering the house implicated the Fourth Amendment.
Id, at 706.
Here, the sniff search was a tool used to reveal the intimate details within the home that
would otherwise be unattainable without intruding into the home. This is exactly what this Court
sought to prohibit in Kvllo and Karo. In Karo, the beeper did not enhance the officers’ senses,
like the thermal-imaging detector in Kvllo. nevertheless this Court determined a Fourth
Amendment search occurred. This holding suggests the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer
from using tools to obtain details from within the home, not merely having their senses
enhanced. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kvllo noted that the rule this Court crafted inferentially
must prohibit “the use of other new devices that might detect the odor of deadly bacteria or
chemicals for making a new type of high explosive, even if the devices (like the dog sniffs) are
‘so limited both in the maimer in which’ they obtain information and ‘in the content of the
information’ they reveal.” 533 U.S. at 48. This Court should affirm its clear rule that police may
not obtain information from within the home that they otherwise could not without intruding into
the constitutionally protected area. This will ensure that police carmot invade a citizen’s
foundational right to be free from governmental intrusion in their homes.
2.

Jardines’ front porch is an area intimately tied to the home and should be
afforded the same protections as the home itself

The front porch of Jardines’ residence is an area immediately surrounding the home and
should be considered part of the curtilage of the home. The protection of the Fourth Amendment
applies to citizens in their ‘‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence includes protection for the curtilage of the home, which is defined as
“the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house.” United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. 294, 300

(1987). Whether an area immediately surrounding the home is considered part of its curtilage is
determined by a four factor test: (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is
within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and
(4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by passersby. Id at 295.
These factors aid in the determination of “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the
home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment
protection.” Id. at 301.
For example, in Dunn, the defendant sought to suppress evidence that police obtained
from the bam located approximately sixty yards from his home. Id In rejecting the defendant’s
claim that the bam laid within the curtilage of his home, this Court applied the four-factor test:
The bam was located 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from
the house itself . . . [the] bam did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was
enclosed by a fence . . . law enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating
that the bam was not being used for intimate activities of the home . . . [And]
respondent did little to protect the bam area from observation by those standing in the
open fields.
Id at 302.
This Court concluded that the barn’s remote location rendered it not so intimately tied to
the home itself to be considered part of the curtilage of the home. Id at 301.
On the other hand, in State v. Reinier. 628 N.W. 2d 460, 467 (la. 2001), the Iowa
Supreme Court held that when officers approached Reinier's house and knocked on the front
door that entry into the porch area by police constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The court reasoned that “[t]he porch of Reinier's house was just like any other portion of her
house. It had glass-encased windows covered with blinds. The entrance to the porch had a solid
wood door with a deadbolt lock and a screen door. Id. at 467.

Here, like Reinier. police came onto Jardines’ front porch, an area that physically touches
his home. Although Jardines’ porch did not have glass-encased windows covered with blinds,
Ihe front porch is attached to his home, satisfying the proximity element of the Dunn test. On
balance, existing precedent may not indicate a porch warrants the same protection as the interior
of the home, however, extending protection to the porch, at least where police intend to conduct
a search, would curtail exploitive and unreasonable police probes not related to the traditional
knock and talk.
3.

Officer Bartelt and his drug detection dog did not have an implied
invitation to conduct a search on Jardines’ front porch.

While police officers and other members of the public may have an implied invitation to
knock at a citizen’s front door or deliver a package, this general permission does not include an
invitation to bring a drug detection dog onto the property to conduct a sniff search. The concept
of an implied invitation exists because “[ijn the course of urban life, we have come to expect
various members of the public to enter upon such a driveway, e.g., brush salesmen, newspaper
boys, postmen. Girl Scout cookie sellers, distressed motorists, neighbors, fnends.” State y.
Corbett. 15 Or. App. 470, 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1973). An implied invitation is limited, and “where
it exists, [the invitation] extends only to those areas of the property that would be used when
approaching the residence in an ordinary attempt to speak with the occupants.” Robinson v.
Com.. 45 Va. App. 592,611 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
For example, in State v, Ridgwav. 57 Wash. App. 915,917 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990),
deputies walked around a closed gate and up a drive to the defendant’s house where they
observed potted marijuana plants growing next to the steps. Ridgeway successfully argued that
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the police did not have an implied invitation to come onto his property and that the information
police obtained could not be used to show probable cause for a warrant. Id at 918.
Here, Officer Bartelt and the drug detection dog came onto the property for the express
0

purpose of searching for narcotics. An implied invitation exists only where citizens would
reasonably allow persons to enter their property. Because citizens would neither expect nor
permit a police officer with a drug detection dog onto their property, there was no implied
invitation.
4.

The plain view exception does not apply to objects concealed within the
home that are undetectable to an officer’s unenhanced five-senses.

0

It is axiomatic that “police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.”
California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). Failure to obstruct methods of detection that
enhance the human senses to uncover the intimate details within the home, which are not in plain
view, does not render a reasonable expectation of privacy null. Taborda, 635 F.2d at 138.
(#

For example, in Taborda. police used high-powered telescopes from 190 feet to detect
activities occurring within the home, which would have been undetectable to the unaided eye.
Id. at 139. The court held “[t]o the extent, however, that the agents used the telescope to identify
objects or activities that were not identified without an instrument, those observations were
improper without a search warrant and could not form the basis for issuance of a warrant.” Id at
0

139.
Similarly, in Kvllo. police used a thermal-imaging detector to uncover activities not in
plain view. 533 U.S. at 27. This Court stated “that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
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without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search ” Id. at 34
(citations omitted).
Conversely, in Greenwood, police legally obtained information from the defendant’s
garbage can, which he had placed out on a public sidewalk. 486 U.S. at 37. This Court held that
respondents “exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.” Id at 40. Respondents exhibited their lack of an expectation of
privacy by knowingly discarding their property where it was exposed to the public and for the
express purpose of conveying it to third party trash collectors. Id at 41. Hence, conduct and
information that persons knowingly expose to the public are not protected under the Fourth
Amendment. Id
Here, as in Taborda and Kvllo. the government used a tool to expose information within
the home which would otherwise be undetectable to police. Like Kvllo, where police used a
thermal-imaging detector to reveal an otherwise invisible heat signature, the use of a drug
detection dog allows officers to detect what would otherwise be undetectable to the officers
themselves. 533 U.S. at 34. Where such scant quantities are emanating from the home that
officers cannot detect them with their five-senses, using a tool that can detect them does not
render the object in plain view. Id The government contends that the search is justifiable
because drug detection dogs are detecting the scent of particles emanating from the home. (J.A.
26.) The holdings in Kvllo and Taborda stand for the proposition that a search occurs whenever
police use tools to detect information from within the home that the officers themselves could
not have detected with their own five-senses. Although the record shows that detective Pedraja
detected the scent of marijuana, he did so only after the unconstitutional search. (J.A. 27.)

C.

The Federal Sniff Search Cases Are Inapplicable to the Home Because Those
Searches Occurred in Public Places Where the Objects of the Search Had Already
Been Seized.

The three federal sniff test cases this Court has ruled on are distinguishable from sniff
searches conducted at private residences. Each of the cited searches occurred in a public place,
involved a government need to regulate public safety, and was conducted only after government
agents had apprehended the object of the search. S^ United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 US. 32, 43 (2000); Illinois v. Cabajl^, 543 U.S.
405,409 (2005). In contrast, citizens’ expectations of privacy are at their highest in their homes,
the government has no special interest in regulating conduct within homes, and citizens are less
anonymous in their homes than in public places. Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511.
First, in Place, this Court addressed the issue of whether police, based on reasonable
suspicion, could temporarily seize a piece of luggage at an airport and then subject the luggage to
a sniff test by a drug detection dog. 462 U.S. at 701. Police became suspicious of Place s
behavior at the departure airport and seized his luggage, then subjected it to a sniff test by a drug
detection dog at the arrival airport, where they found cocaine. Id at 698. This Court mled that a
dog sniff test does not implicate the Fourth Amendment when conducted on luggage that has
been seized at an airport based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity, where the luggage
has been separated from its owner and the sniff test is conducted in a public space. Id at 707.
This Court reasoned that although a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of
personal luggage, because the search was conducted in a public place and the search was
minimally invasive, the sniff test did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Id Because citizens have a lower expectation of privacy in public places and the

search did not involve an officer rummaging through the luggage, the search was permissible.

Id
This Court also addressed the permissibility of sniff tests on vehicles using public
roadways. In Edmond, this Court addressed whether police may conduct a sniff test on the
exterior of the vehicle stopped at dmg interdiction checkpoint. 531 U.S. at 35. In upholding the
sniff test, this Court reasoned that the action was allowable because “an exterior sniff of an
automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information
other than the presence or absence of narcotics.” Id at 40.
Similarly, in Caballes, this Court addressed the issue of whether police may conduct a
sniff test on the exterior of a vehicle during a lawfiil traffic stop. 543 U.S. at 409. Adopting
similar reasoning to the other sniff test cases, this Court ruled that the sniff test was permissible,
stating “a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog [i]s 'sui generis' because it
‘discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.’” Id
The justifications for sniff tests conducted on vehicles and luggage seized in public
places are less forceful when applied to citizens’ homes. First, while the government has a
special interest in regulating passenger safety for airlines and roadways, no such justification
applies to private residences. Id at 407. When citizens travel today, they may be subjected to
full-body imaging scans, x-ray scans of their luggage, or sobriety checkpoints. The
government’s traditional need to ensure passenger safety in airports and on roadways justifies the
diminished privacy experienced by citizens. Id In contrast, it would be patently unreasonable to
subject citizens’ homes to such procedures where no such justification exists. Thus, the
government’s need to regulate public safety causes a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy
to be lower when travelling than when in one’s home.

Second, extending sniff tests to the home undermines the special protection this Court has
recognized for homes. Unlike a search conducted in an airport or roadway, the present search
was conducted on the porch of a private residence. (J.A. 5.) This Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence recognizes a man’s basic right to retreat into his home and guaranties protection of
the intimate details within it. Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511.
Finally, searches of the home are more intrusive because homeowners are subjected to a
higher degree of public humiliation. While a person is essentially anonymous in an airport or in
his vehicle, neighbors and pedestrians are likely to recognize and associate a person with his
home. The spectacle created by the officers, DEA agents around the perimeter, and a police dog
sniffing at a person’s front door is qualitatively different than a search conducted in a public
place. The scale of the effort implicates the Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable government intrusion.
1.

The false positives study cited in Caballes undermines the government’s
sni generis justification.

The justification that drug dogs alert only to the presence of narcotics is undermined by
the false positives study cited in Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Caballes, “a study cited by
Illinois in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs in
artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time,
depending on the length of the search.” 543 U.S. at 412.
This analysis suggests that sniff tests are like the technology used in Kyllo because they
may also detect lawful activity. 533 U.S. at 29. Inferentially, if a drug detection dog mistakenly
alerts to the presence of narcotics, it has detected and alerted to lawful scents. Being that
thermal-imaging detectors were impermissible because they could be used to detect “at what
hour a woman may use her sauna,” sniff tests detecting lawful activity should similarly give rise

m

to a constitutional violation. Id. In Kvllo. it was not that police actually detected lawful activity;
rather, the mere possibility that thermal-imaging detectors could be used to detect lawful activity
resulted in a constitutional violation. Id, Given that citizen’s homes will invariably contain

0

lawful scents that sniff tests may falsely alert to, the justification that sniff tests will only detect
the presence contraband should not be accepted. Id at 409.
2.

0

The illegality of the object of the search should not preclude the
application of the Fourth Amendment because this approach would lead to
an arbitrary and discriminatory use of government action.

The Fourth Amendment requirements of reasonableness and probable cause were
0

intended to impose standards upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including
law enforcement agents, in order “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions.” Delaware v. Frouse. 440 U.S. 648.653-54 (1979). The central purpose was

0

the prevent indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of “general
warrants.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 584.
A standard declaring searches that reveal only illegal conduct per se legal abrogates the

0

central purpose of preventing police from employing the search in an arbitrary or discriminatory
marmer. Prouse. 440 U.S. at 653. Police will be able to search every citizen’s house, apartment,
or locker with impunity. This blanket allowance undercuts the protections citizens have come to
0

expect in their homes and creates the incentive for police to develop more technologies that
“only” detect illegal activity.
0

0
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II.

A LAWFUL FOURTH AMENDMENT SNIFF SEARCH REQUIRES AN
APPROPRIATE EVIDENTIARY SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
A.

Probable Cause Is the Per Se Evidentiary Standard for Any Fourth Amendment
Search.

The Fourth Amendment states, “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend IV. In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
100-02 (1959), this Court defended the legal philosophy behind the presumption that a breach of
the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause:
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history...That
philosophy later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early
American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show,
common rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to suspect’ was not
adequate to support a warrant. And that principle has survived to this day.. .It is
important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the standard set
by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen.

This Court traditionally recognized that “in cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonably practicable, it must be used.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)
(warrantless search of a vehicle). The Carroll Court further held that, “in cases where seizure is
impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he
can show the court probable cause.” Id. Thus, this Court recognized that when a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure occurs, a search must be justified by either a judicially approved
warrant or the existence of facts giving rise to probable cause. Id
This Court in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968), made clear that it would not retreat
from its “holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.” Even though this Court carved out a
significant exception to the probable cause requirement for searches in public for the protection

of police and public safety, this Court nevertheless maintained that underlying police conduct
"'must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches

and seizures” and that “the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the
requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant in this context.” Id (emphasis added).
This Court held that “officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches
without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the
constitutional standard of probable cause.” Id. at 37.
This Court, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 413 U.S. 266, 287 (1973), held that
“the ordinary rule is that to be reasonable under the [Fourth] Amendment a search must be
authorized by warrant issued by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause.” While this
Court held that persons found at the border are subject to warrantless searches without probable
cause, it also held that “away from the border, persons and automobiles may be searched for
narcotics or other contraband only on probable cause.” Id at 295.
This Court in United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 807-08 (1982), held the traditional
Carroll requirement of probable cause for warrantless searches to be good law under
contemporary conceptions of Fourth Amendment protection. In Ross, this Court held that a
search is “not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even
though a warrant has not actually been obtained.” Id at 809 (warrantless search of vehicle).
B.

Exceptions to the Per Se Rule Require First That “Special Needs”^xist at the
Inception of the Search and Second That Public Interest Outweighs an Individual
Interest in Privacy in the Context of the Search.
1.

The traditional probable cause requirement for a warrantless search
demands “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”

“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a

court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.” New Jersey v.
T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). This Court has echoed that rule in subsequent cases. See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n. 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin.
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). This Court has further held that exceptions to the traditional probable
cause requirement for warrantless searches cannot be justified by the prevention of the
destruction of potential evidence. Griffin. U.S. 392 at 29.
In Terry, this Court held that a “stop and frisk” search of a suspect who officers believed
with a “reasonable suspicion” was about to commit a crime was justified by the “special needs”
of law enforcement. 392 U.S. at 5. This Court held that police, in the line of duty, require the
ability to pat down suspects for weapons when conducting investigations to ensure their safety.
Id at 23. This Court did not intend for the rule established in Terry to be used in any manner
other than police officers conducting “stop and frisk” searches for weapons that could be used to
harm them or the public. Id This Court explained that “the sole justification of the search in the
present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other
hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” Id at 29. In subsequent cases, this
Court has upheld this limitation. See Dunaway v. New. 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (limiting
Terry to “on-the-street frisk for weapons”); Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979)
(holding Terry does not support “any search whatever for anything but weapons”).
The exception in Terrv “is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or
destruction of evidence of crime.” 392 U.S. at 29. The Terry Court further explained that an
officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id at 21.

Thus the “special need” in this case is for the police to be able to maintain reasonable
expectations of safety while doing their job, which is inherently dangerous. Terry does not apply
to the case at hand. Police were not in any immediate danger when they conducted the search of
Jardines’ home. In fact, their surveillance of his home indicated that Jardines was not at home.
(J.A. 38.) Their belief that Jardines was not home destroyed any possibility that the public or
officers were in any danger when the search was conducted. Moreover, if officers truly believed
that they were in danger, they would not have approached the door without first calling for
backup. The presence of a drug detection dog would not provide any protection against any
physical danger that could be awaiting in a home. Thus it is, at worst, a reasonable inference that
the officers did not reasonably believe themselves or the public to be in any immediate danger.
Furthermore, this Court maintained that the need to prevent the destruction of evidence was not a
“special need.” If expediting the investigative process was the “sole” reason that officers
searched Jardines* home, they would have unlawfully abrogated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Terry decision led to a series of subsequent cases in which this Court has held lawful
warrantless searches of individuals without the traditional probable cause requirement being
satisfied. In T.L.O.. this Court held lawful the search of a student without a warrant and without
probable cause. 469 U.S. at 347-48. This Court held that maintaining safety for students in a
compulsory public education system constituted a “special need.” Id at 351 -52. There is a
“special need” because the government has taken responsibility for children through compulsory
education. Id However, Jardines’ home is not comparable to a public school because it is not a
0

venue that hosts children who are mandated to be there. The “special need” to protect children
from danger and maintain a healthy learning environment does not extend to a private home.
Children must go to school and are expected to get a good education, thus the need to protect
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them there is paramount. Private property, specifically Jardines’ home, is not a location at which
children are required to be present for several hours throughout the day, thus the government
does not have the same interest in promoting an enviromnent safe for children within his home.
Indeed, it is reasonable for the government to abrogate an individual’s Second Amendment rights
at a school, but that does not empower it to do the same at a private residence.
This Court has further applied the T.L.O. exception to vehicle stops conducted by police
officers. See United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675. 696-97 (1985) (vehicle stop for police
investigation with less than probable cause); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (random vehicle stop to
check for driving documentation). The distinction between Sharpe and Prouse and the case at
hand is that in the former cases, a “special need” to protect the public from potentially dangerous
activity in driving cars on public roads satisfies the first prong of the test in Terry. Here, no such
need existed. Police suspected a marijuana grow operation existed in Jardines’ home. (J.A. 8.)
A marijuana grow operation differs from a car on a public road in two ways. First, the vehicle is
in public where it poses a danger to those around it. Id. at 658. Here, the marijuana was
confined to the inside of a home where the public had no access to it. (J.A. 17.) Second, a car
can cause serious harm to individuals should accidents occur. Id. Marijuana has no similar
capacity. Marijuana confined in a house cannot explode, run into, kill or injure the public. The
marijuana grow operation does not meet the Sharpe and Prouse requirement of a “special need.”
In other cases, this Court has held that highly regulated private locations constitute a
“special need.” See New York v. Burger. 482 U.S. 691, 712-713 (1987) (inspection of highly
regulated business location for compliance with regulations); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
601-06 (1981) (inspection of underground mines for compliance with regulations); United States
v. Biswell. 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (inspection of gun dealers for compliance with
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regulations). Highly regulated locations are special because their regulation is necessary to
ensure public safety. Id. at 315. This line of cases is also distinguishable from the current case
in that the area searched in the current case, the home, is not a highly regulated location. In
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Burger. Donovan, and Biswell, the government interest in ensuring compliance with safety
regulations to promote public safety was so great that a “special need” existed and the
government could point to a statute to support such a “special need.” Id. at 317. However, no

#

such regulatory statute existed in this case. The “special need” must extend “beyond the normal
need of law enforcement.” T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 351. Thus the crux of the Burger. Donovan, and

m

Biswell “special needs” exception is that the statutory regulations that the government cited in
those cases were beyond normal criminal statutes. Instead, the statutes ensured compliance with
regulations at highly regulated places by allowing searches with less than probable cause. This
Court designated this, specifically, as a “special need” and one that is “beyond the normal need
of law enforcement.” Jardines’ home is not regulated by a special statute and thus does not
require the same type of compliance checks that the locations in Burger, Donovan, and Biswell

m

did.
This Court has also recognized a “special need” in the regulation of the borders of the
nation. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543. 566-67 (1976) (random inspection and
questioning of aliens at the border). In Martinez-Fuerte. the location in which the search was
conducted was both public and highly regulated. Id. at 554. The border presents an immediate
and significant danger to national security, constituting a “special need.” Id. at 545. Jardines’

#

home is distinguishable from the border in that his home is not a public place, nor does it present
a serious and immediate threat to national security.
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The final area that this Court has recognized a “special need” is in cases involving
previously convicted criminals. Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520, 562-63 (1979) (cavity searches
of prison inmates). A prison is both public in the sense that there is no expectation of privacy
there and is the most regulated of the aboveraentioned areas. Id at 546. Furthermore, under a
Terry analysis, searches of prison inmates in Bell helps correction officers perform their duties in
relative safety. Id. at 547. In the case at hand, the record does not indicate that Jardines is a
convict. Furthermore, his home is not public in the same sense that a prison would be
recognized as public and is in no way regulated like a prison.
In the single instance in which this Court has allowed a search of a home with less than
probable cause, it has required that “special needs” exist. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880. In Griffin,
this Court held that the warrantless search of a probationer’s home without probable cause was
lawful. Id The Griffin Court held that an effective probation system necessitated the use of a
lower evidentiary standard for searches of probationers’ homes to ensure that they are not
recidivating and that the requirement of probable cause to conduct a search for contraband in a
probationer’s home would be impracticable. Id at 873-74. But nothing in the record points to
Jardines’ home being subject to the Griffin rule. The detectives in this case were not conducting
a search of a probationer’s home and there is no government system or program that would
necessitate the search of his home to ensure its efficacy. Griffin does not apply.
In the case at hand, the lack of a “special need” bars any weighing of public and private
interests in determining the reasonableness of the search. A “special need” is necessary as a
preliminary finding before any such balancing can occur. T.L.O^, 469 U.S. at 351. The lack of
any facts indicating a “special need” “beyond the normal need for law enforcement”, thus ends
any further inquiry into the Terrv test.

2.

Even if the Court holds that a “special need” exists, the government
interests in the search do not outweigh Jardines’ reasonable expectation of
privacy.

Only after a court finds that a “special need” existed that may necessitate a standard
lower than probable cause may a court balance the interests of the public against the individual
interest of privacy from a warrantless search. Id “Where a careful balancing of governmental
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause” a search may be lawful in the
absence of a warrant or probable cause. Id
In Terry, this Court carved out from traditional probable cause requirements an important
safeguard for police and public safety. 392 U.S. at 1. Terry involved the warrantless search and
seizure of an individual that police suspected was about to commit a robbery. Id at 5. The
suspect was in public, loitering in front of a store in the middle of the night. Id at 5-8. The
officer in the case did not possess the probable cause necessary to conduct a traditional search or
seizure of the defendant. Id at 22. This Court nevertheless held that the stop and frisk was
lawful as an exception to the traditional and still standing probable cause requirement for
ordinary searches. ^ at 30. In doing so, this Court adopted a new test for allowing lawful
searches of defendants in public in the absence of probable cause. The test first examines the
“nature and extent” of the government interests involved. Id at 22. Second, the test looks to the
“nature and quality” of intrusion of the search being conducted. Id at 24.
As to the first prong of the test, this Court recognized that police officers must maintain a
reasonable expectation of safety while conducting their duties in public. Id at 23. This Court
specifically pointed to the fact that a police officer, when conducting reasonable investigations of
suspicious activity, must be able to do so with the knowledge that suspects are not armed and
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dangerous. Id at 23-24. This Court also pointed to the importance of ensuring that the public be
kept safe from dangerous suspect activity. Id. at 31.
As to the second prong of the test, this Court determined that the search, while intrusive,
was minimally intrusive and narrow in its “purpose, character, and extent”. Id at 25 (citing
Preston v. United States. 376 U.S. 364,367 (1964)). This Court further held that a search of this
type must be limited to weapons necessitated by “exigencies which justify its inception.” Id at
26 (citing Warden v. Havden. 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)). In Terry, the search was minimally
invasive in that the officers only patted down the suspect’s pockets to ensure that he possessed
no weapons. Id at 25-26. In that context, this Court allowed the search on less than probable
cause because the government interest was so great that it outweighed the suspect’s individual
expectation of privacy on a public street. Id at 23-31.
In the case before this Court, the first prong of the test is not satisfied. Detectives were
not in any position where they would reasonably believe themselves or the public to be in
immediate danger. Detectives in the case at hand argued that their initial surveillance of
Jardines’ home indicated that nobody was home. (J.A. 38.) The only logical reason that the
detectives wanted to conduct the search without a warrant and without probable cause was to
expedite their investigation and ensure that no evidence was destroyed as a result. However, the
Terry Court specifically stated that this was not a sufficient reason for conducting a warrantless
search in the absence of probable cause. Id Thus the government interest in the case at hand
does not weigh heavily in its favor.
Jardines, though, presumptively carries a significant expectation of privacy within his
home. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution reads: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Houses are specifically enumerated locations that the
Constitution protects in the Fourth Amendment. Id. This Court has given this fact significant
weight in cases involving warrantless searches of homes.
In Coolidee v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 451 (1971) (citing Jones v. United States.
357 U.S. 493,497 (1958)), this Court held that "belief, however well founded, that an article
sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place
without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably
showing probable cause.” This Court has always maintained that “the Fourth Amendment
protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s
home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms.” Payton, 445 U.S. at
589-90. “At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intmsion.” Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. “The Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances,
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
Because Jardines was in his home, his expectation of privacy was at its height. His
interest in being free fi'om government intrusion at his home is not only subjectively expected,
but is constitutionally enumerated and diligently guarded by the courts. The first prong of the
test fails to favor the government because the interests of the government are minimal while
Jardines’ interests in privacy are paramount.
Even if this Court finds that the government has a significant interest in the search of
Jardines’ home, that interest does not outweigh Jardines’ individual expectation of privacy.
First, the search in Terry was public, where one is already visible to the public and has waived

his presumptive expectation of privacy in his home. Police never physically penetrated a private
residence to conduct the Terrv search, which as this Court has indicated in its precedent, is a
serious government intrusion. See Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511. Second, the Terry Court held
that the search of the suspect was minimally intrusive because officers only patted down the
suspect’s outer pockets for weapons. Terrv. 392 U.S. at 24. However, this Court did
acknowledge that even in that instance, the search was an “annoying, frightening, and perhaps
humiliating experience.” Id. The presence of police and a drug detection dog at a private home
constitutes an even more “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating” experience in that the
individual’s neighbors, friends, and family are likely present to observe the intrusion. The
embarrassment of a search in the presence of one’s acquaintances is far more intrusive than one
in the presence of strangers in public because after the search an individual must continue to
interact with those he knows. The impact of the search lasts far longer, as a result. The
invasiveness of the search of Jardines’ home, thus, is far more significant than that in Terry and
is enough to support a finding in his favor.
The search of Jardines’ home is not justified by a “special need.” Even if this Court
holds that there was a “special need”, Jardines’ individual expectation of privacy far outweighs
the government’s minimal interest in the search. Because the search does not meet the Terry
standard for an exception to the probable cause requirement for a search, probable cause must be
the evidentiary burden for the search at Jardines’ home.
3.

Officers did not possess probable cause to search Jardines’ home.

In Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983), this Court resolved the question of whether
an informant tip was sufficient evidence to support probable cause. This Court held that the tip
from an informant was sufficiently detailed and corroborated by police surveillance and

investigation to support a finding by the reviewing magistrate of probable cause. Id at 245-46.
This Court adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test in determining whether or not a tip was
sufficient for establishing probable cause in an investigation. Id. at 230-31. The credibility of
the tip should be viewed in light of all of the other evidence collected throughout the course of
the police investigation. Id.
The case at hand does not meet the standard set forth in Gates to support a finding of
probable cause. In Gates, this Court held particularly important the fact that the tip was from a
police informant. Id at 230. Here, the tip implicating Jardines in the grow operation was
anonymous. (J.A. 8.) Thus the tip in the present case was not inherently credible. In addition,
the amount of police investigation leading up to the sniff search does not significantly improve
the credibility value of tip. Officers observed for fifteen minutes that the blinds were closed,
nobody came in and out of the house, and that the air conditioner was cycling throughout the
surveillance. (J.A. 32.) The observations made by the police officers were too tenuous to
establish inferences amounting to probable cause, even with the crime stoppers tip. Blinds being
closed, the absence of foot traffic around the home, and the air conditioning running for fifteen
minutes is so common an occurrence that an uncorroborated tip could establish probable cause to
search any home with minimal surveillance. That low of an evidentiary burden on police would
completely abrogate Fourth Amendment protections of the home and destroy “the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511.

C.

Even if this Court Holds That the Search of Jardines’ Home Meets the Standard
for an Exception to the Probable Cause Requirement, this Court Should Require
Probable Cause for Public Policy Reasons.

This Court’s fervent protection of Fourth Amendment rights has always stemmed from the
fear of the “grave danger” of the abuse of discretion by police. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (citing
Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. at 559). This fear is justified by the logical conclusion that police
have a significant and often perverse incentive to obtain evidence in criminal investigations
regardless of the protections that the Constitution affords United States citizens. United States v.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972).
Police officers are lauded for their ability to arrest suspected criminals and their job performance
is often measured on that ability. Such incentives must be checked by the judiciary to ensure that
the harms of the “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience” of a search at one’s
home are not arbitrarily experienced. Terry. 392 U.S. at 24. In allowing officers to use a low
standard to conduct sniff searches, this Court would be granting officers the authority to search
homes with almost no evidence.
The impact of that policy, combined with police incentives to arrest the most suspects
would lead to an Orwellian dystopia. The combination could lead to police officers fabricating
surveillance information because the evidentiary standard is so low that there would be no way
of knowing whether the surveillance was real or not. If the facts of the case at hand are to be
used as an example, any person who, for fifteen minutes, leaves their air conditioning rutming,
has their blinds closed, and who does not enter or exit their home would be subject to a search if
police “hear” from an uncorroborated source that he may be conducting illegal activity in the
home. Police could freely approach homes and conduct sniff searches with all of the
embarrassing harms described in Terry with minimal surveillance. This Court would be

condoning the presence of police on comers of every street with drug detection dogs on the leash
ready to sniff homes at the first sign of suspicious activity. This type of policy seems to be the
exact type of harm the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent.
Furthennore, if this Court were to rule in favor of Jardines, it would be encouraging better
police work which would yield significant benefits. In the inevitable event that police were to
abuse this Court’s ruling should it rule in favor of the State of Florida, appellate courts would be
confronted with the problem of having to review a plethora of cases in which appellants would
argue that the lower evidentiary standard was abused by officers investigating their cases.
Invariably, many of those cases would either prove to have not met the evidentiary burden set
forth by this Court or would prove to be based on fabricated evidence as described above. If that
is the case, this Court would have to vacate the judgments of those who should be in prison for
crimes they committed. United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 973-74 (1984).
In addition, if drug trafficking really does go hand in hand with gun possession, as this
Court has accepted in a variety of cases, then this Court should be encouraging cautious police
investigation of that criminal field. S|^ Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); Watson v.
United States. 552 U.S. 74 (20071: Muscarello v I Inited States, 524 U.S. 125(1998). The use of
a drug detection dog is not going to protect officers from being shot if they approach the door of
a “dangerous” grow operation with the intent to conduct a search. Instead, officer safety is best
maintained by requiring officers to conduct due diligence by conducting sufficient surveillance
of the scene such that he knows whether or not firearms are likely to be in the house. Lowering
the evidentiary burden encourages just the opposite. Officers will approach the door without
conducting sufficient surveillance to ensure no weapons are inside and more will get injured or
killed in the line of duty as a result.

CONCLUSION
The courts have traditionally recognized the significance of the home in every
American’s ability to fully exercise his Fourth Amendment rights to the fullest. This Court has
diligently guarded the private individual against government intrusion into the home. This Court
should affirm the Florida Supreme Court decision because the use of a drug detection dog at a
home is a search under the Katz test. Further, because the search does not comport to the
probable cause exception requirements, probable cause must be the evidentiary standard used to
conduct a dog sniff search at a home. Detectives’ lack of probable cause here warrants a
judgment in favor of Jardines.
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